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Preface
1
This report is a final product of a research project, 
called EU-GRASP that aimed at a better under-
standing of the EU’s role in regional and global 
peace and security issues. Undertaking this was 
a fascinating and challenging task, especially as 
the subject matter was, for various reasons, a real 
moving target.
First, between the time of submitting the research 
proposal in 2007 and the completion of the project 
beginning 2012, the geopolitical world changed 
dramatically. Not only did the world become 
more multipolar than ever before, the gravity of 
economic power shifted considerably from the 
West to the East. This has major consequences for 
the European security strategy that always had 
a strong Atlantic component. But today the US 
seems more and more to be looking to the Pacific, 
as demonstrated for instance by Hillary Clinton’s 
article ‘America’s Pacific Century’ (Foreign Affairs, 
November 2011). 
Secondly, the growing interconnectedness of 
states and people continues to bring with it new 
and often-unforeseen security threats. As a result, 
the security agenda is constantly changing and so 
are people’s perception of threats and insecurity.
Thirdly, throughout the duration of the project, the 
EU’s internal organisation as a security actor was in 
constant transformation. Following the Lisbon Tre-
aty, the new structures of the ‘European External 
Action Service’ began to be implemented.
Together, these elements contributed towards 
influencing the EU’s security agenda. Yet, such 
transformation also brought to the fore the fact 
that security governance at a European level nee-
ded to be multilateral. The present report therefore 
aims to bring together some of the main findings 
from the case studies undertaken in the course of 
the EU-GRASP project. These studies demonstrate 
that one cannot speak of a single form of European 
security governance. Indeed, there are several types 
of security challenges, which all call for different 
approaches and various ‘coalitions’ of actors. 
There is a need for fluidity in the architecture of 
global and regional solutions according to the 
specific security issues encountered. Effective 
multilateralism, which presupposes working more 
closely and efficiently with others, is more and more 
also a matter of networked multilateralism, with 
an emphasis on the coordinated management and 
regulation of security issues by different kinds of 
actors. 
With the present report, the reader is presented 
with some of the complexities of how the EU deals 
with peace and security, and with a first translation 
into policy recommendations regarding the future 
of the EU as a security actor.
Luk Van Langenhove
EU-GRASP Coordinator 
& UNU-CRIS Director
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A foresight study, which builds on the project’s 
findings and proposes scenarios for future EU 
policy directions towards external security 
relations and multilateral approaches to threats 
and challenges.
Overall, EU-GRASP examined the notion and 
practice of multilateralism in order to provide the 
required theoretical background for assessing the 
EU’s current security activities with multi-polarism, 
international law, regional integration processes 
and the United Nations system.
Who funds EU-GRASP?
EU-GRASP was funded by the European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Research & 
Innovation, Seventh Framework Programme, Socio-
Economic Sciences and the Humanities.
Project officer: Dr. Angela Liberatore (European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Research & 
Innovation)
Who coordinated the project?
The coordination of EU-GRASP was done by 
the United Nations University institute on 
Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-
CRIS).
What is EU-GRASP?
EU-GRASP was conceived to contribute towards 
the understanding and articulation of the current 
and future role of the EU as a global actor in 
multilateral security governance, in a challenged 
multilateral enviroment. The project examined the 
notion and practice of multilateralism and security 
in order to provide an adequate theoretical 
background for assessing the EU’s current security 
activities at different levels of cooperation, 
ranging from bilateralism to inter-regionalism and 
multilateralism, and their inter-linkages. EU-GRASP 
was a 3-year project that started in February 2009 
and ended in January 2012.
The project work plan consisted of the following 
components:
An analysis of the evolving concepts of 
multilateralism and security, and the EU’s role as a 
security actor;
Case studies of the EU’s approach to a number of 
specific security issues: regional conflict, terrorism, 
WMD proliferation, migration, energy and climate 
change, and severe violations of human rights;
A transversal comparative analysis applying and 
integrating the case-study findings; 
Introducing EU-GRASP
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Who was involved in the project?
Consortium partners of EU-GRASP are: University 
of Warwick (UK), University of Gothenburg 
(Sweden), Florence Forum on the Problems of 
Peace and War (Italy), KULeuven (Belgium), Centre 
for International Governance Innovation (Canada), 
Peking University (China), Institute for Security 
Studies (South Africa) and Ben-Gurion University of 
the Negev (Israel).
the EU-GRASP International Advisory Board
Louise Fawcett (Oxford University), Nicola 
Harrington-Buhay (UNDP Brussels, EU-UN 
Liaison Office), Karen Fogg (former European 
Commission official, associate research fellow 
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies), Ole 
Waever (Copenhagen University), Alain Délétroz 
(International Crisis Group), Alvaro de Vasconcelos 
(EUISS), and the two academic coordinators of 
sister FP7-projects MERCURY (Mark Aspinwall, 
Edinburgh University) and EU4SEAS (Jordi Vaquer i 
Fanes, CIDOB).
What were the project objectives?
Strengthen the understanding of multilateralism, 
and its relation with other concepts such as multi-
polarity and interregionalism;
Understanding the changes within the field 
of security and their effect on the governance 
structures namely in the approach to security 
cooperation and multilateralism;
Better understanding of the evolving nature of the 
EU as a global actor within the field of security and 
EU’s current role in global security governance;
Understanding and developing the changing role 
of the EU towards other regional integration 
processes in the peace and security field;
Better understanding of the relationship between 
external and internal dimensions of the above 
mentioned policy domains, namely the legal 
aspects of EU’s involvement in security at regional 
and global levels;
Suggesting future roles to the EU on the world 
stage within the field of security;
Advancing state-of-the art theories on 
multilateralism, by integrating the contemporary 
agenda of international security, multilateral 
security governance and the overall role of the EU 
within these fields;
Advancing policy-making - Increasing awareness 
and information, and improving the contribution 
to the formulation and implementation of 
European cooperation initiatives at the global and 
interregional level. 
8 9
governance’ and its applicability to EU’s practice. In 
the final analysis, these two research components 
were brought together with the aim of bridging 
the existing gap between the literature on security 
theory and those on security governance, using the 
results deriving therefrom to interrogate the EU as 
a global-regional actor in peace and security. 
The central argument of the first conceptual 
research is that there is need to develop a 
specific theoretical framework for analysing 
the EU as a peace and security actor. Whilst the 
EU/European security governance literature 
certainly provides a flexible analytical prism for 
this purpose, it falls short, in our view, of the 
optimal analytical tool in that its application is 
limited to the conceptual notion of security and 
therefore remains pre-theoretical. We propose 
that it is by utilising the security studies literature 
that we can provide a flexible framework and a 
comparative methodology, which transcends 
the traditional notion of security - a notion that 
is essentially defined in terms of threats to 
states. This suggested approach, in turn, would 
engender a more sophisticated and comprehensive 
understanding of how the EU does and speaks 
security. 
The second major theme we investigated concerns 
the levels of transversal cooperation the EU is 
involved in (bilateral, regional, interregional and 
global). The mapping of bilateral cooperation 
EU-GRASP is aimed at studying the role of the EU 
as a global-regional actor in security and peace. 
This remit implies research that is committed to 
studying not only the present role of the EU in a 
multilateral environment, but which also inquires 
into the EU’s anticipated role in the emerging 
global order.
Attempting such a study enumerated above 
presents, at the best of times, a multi-layered 
challenge to a researcher. It is even more so in 
the environment of challenged multilateralism 
in which the EU currently finds itself. Not only is 
the topic somewhat intractable in its various and 
varied dimensions, but also, undertaking such a 
research is fraught with such pedagogic challenges 
such as what is the best ‘entry point’, what 
methodological strategies should be adopted, 
and, more importantly, how best to present the 
findings.  
At the preliminary stage, we undertook an 
assessment and refinement of concepts that 
would be used in the course of the project, and 
which are relevant to study and understand the 
role of the EU as an actor in peace and security. 
This inceptional endeavour focused principally 
on clarifying theories of security, especially 
those relating to the so-called non-traditional 
security studies, in order to link such theories to 
empirical research. Additionally, our rudimentary 
research also focused on the concept of ‘security 
The research approach
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focused on EU’s interaction with some specific 
states including the United States, Russia, 
China, Japan, Israel, etc. Similarly, the mapping 
of interregional relations offered an overview of 
the current cooperation with Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and the Mediterranean. With regard to 
cooperation at the global level we focused mainly 
on the relation between the EU and the UN, taking 
into cognisance other multilateral frameworks 
that have a global reach. Finally, the mapping 
of the EU as a regional actor highlights the EU’s 
institutional and policy outputs through an 
investigation of its coherence and its current level 
of accountability and legitimacy.
The deepening of theoretical and conceptual 
knowledge about the various issues elucidated 
above, inspired a more robust and comprehensive 
research of the twenty-three (23) case studies 
in the six security issues selected by EU-GRASP. 
The landscape of security studies is over the last 
years completely changed by the debate between 
traditional and non-traditional security issues. 
EU-GRASP takes stock of this and includes the in-
depth study of six security issues: regional conflict, 
terrorism, WMD proliferation, energy security and 
climate change, severe human rights violations and 
migration.
Regional 
conflict
Terrorism WMD
proliferation
Energy security & 
climage change
Migration Severe human 
rights violations
Israeli-Palestinian 
regional security 
complex
Israeli-Palestinian 
regional security 
complex
Iran Central Asia Lybia Israeli-Palestinian 
regional security 
complex
Great Lakes (DRC) Egypt Pakistan-India China Transatlantic 
focus
Darfur/Sudan
Horn of Africa Turkey North Korea Russia South-East gate Zimbabwe
Chad-Sudan-
Central African 
Republic
Afghanistan Mediterranean Lebanon
Russia
EU-GRASP case studies  (see table)
Against the background of its analytical work and 
the results of the case studies and transversal 
reports, EU-GRASP has designed a foresight 
exercise to project the consequences of its findings 
into the near future. The idea of foresight is to 
explore the possible future of EU policies regarding 
different security issues, and according to the 
different forms of multilateral cooperation as a 
variation of key policy choices. 
The foresight exercise is divided into two phases. 
The first concerns the definition of future 
“scenarios” based on EU-GRASP’s findings and 
with additional inputs from a group of experts, 
scholars and practitioners. The second phase 
builds on the various scenarios to identify policy 
implications through a participatory workshop 
with EU policy makers. Interaction with target-
public is key for this project: EU-GRASP desires 
that its work of three years will be relevant for EU’s 
decision-making and role in multilateral security 
governance, whether in relation to EU’s daily 
undertakings or those of its member states. 
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the system. Indeed, the world is today almost fully 
carved up in sovereign states and this affords little 
or no room for the creation of new states. Things 
are much different today than in in 1648, – seen 
as the birth of the Westphalian world order – 
when the chunkiest parts of the world were not 
composed by sovereign states, thus affording great 
opportunities for state creation. Consequently, 
there was an open international system for a long 
time. However, over the years the whole globe 
became partitioned into sovereign states. 
Multilateralism is clearly under challenge in the 
21st century and has been so since the end of the 
Cold War. More than a reflection of the failure of 
the concept, this crisis is the sign of a changing 
international context, which has rendered 
anachronistic the traditional intergovernmental 
multilateralism of the immediate post-World War 
II era. In today’s reality, states play a relatively 
declining role as protagonists in the security 
system, as threats have acquired a system-wide 
significance. In order to overcome this crisis, 
multilateral institutions, such as the UN, need 
to adapt to this change, reinventing themselves 
according to the new context. Thus, as the world 
is changing, so must the concept of governance, 
namely its reflection in the multilateral system. 
The emergence of truly global problems, such 
as climate change, proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and many others, have indeed 
Multilateralism was created as a form of 
cooperation among states that institutionalises 
intergovernmental cooperation and substitutes 
anarchy. The starting point for most scholars who 
study multilateralism is the definition by Keohane 
and its expansion by Ruggie. ‘I limit multilateralism 
to arrangements involving states’ says Keohane 
(1990: 732) and that is a core issue of most of 
the academic thinking on the issue. Multilateral 
arrangements are institutions defined by Keohane 
as ‘persistent sets of rules that constrain activity, 
shape expectations and prescribe roles’ (Keohane 
1988: 384) in a purely institutional (rather than 
normative) manner. Ruggie however, presents a 
definition that is not only institutional but also 
normative, including behaviour. For Ruggie (1993: 
11), multilateralism is an institutional form that 
coordinates relations among three or more states 
on the basis of generalised principles of conduct 
(…) which specify appropriate conduct for a class 
of actions, without regard for the particularistic 
interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies 
that may exist in any specific occurrence. A 
common feature of these and other contemporary 
viewpoints is the centrality of states: they are 
regarded as the constitutive elements of the 
multilateral system and it is their interrelations 
that determine the form and content of 
multilateralism. This implies, as noted by Schweller 
(2010: 149), that international politics is regarded as 
a closed system in at least two ways: it spans the 
whole world and there are huge barriers to entering 
Towards the study of multilateralism 2.0.
Understanding 
Multilateralism
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led to an increasing paradox of governance: ‘the 
policy authority for tackling global problems still 
belongs to the states, while the sources of the 
problems and potential solutions are situated at 
transnational, regional or global level’ (Thakur & 
Van Langenhove 2006). As such the building blocks 
of multilateralism, the states, seem to be less 
and less capable of dealing with the challenges 
of globalisation. But because the multilateral 
world order is so dependent on the input of states, 
multilateralism itself is not functioning well. 
The drama according to Weiss (2008) is that the 
UN would never had emerged at all, if it was not 
configured as an instrument of state interests.
In sum, there seems to be sufficient reasons 
to claim that ‘the values and institutions of 
multilateralism as currently constituted (…) are 
arguably under serious challenge’ (Newman 
& Thakur 2006: 531). But, as suggested by the 
same authors, the fundamental principle of 
multilateralism is not in crisis! What is needed is an 
update of the organisational issues in order to be 
in tune with today’s reality.
Multilateralism is thus both a normative concept 
(it is an ideal to promote) and a practice (it refers to 
a set of existing practices and institutions). At both 
levels it is subject to change and one can think of 
how an updated global multilateral governance 
system could look like. Such a vision could be called 
‘Multilateralism 2.0.’ This is a metaphor as it refers 
to a jargon used in the ICT world. As all metaphors, 
it has its limitations. But metaphors in science 
can also serve the purpose of viewing things from 
new perspectives (Harré 1976). The core of the 
metaphor advanced here is an implicit reference to 
what is now called ‘Web 2.0.’, a concept currently 
used to be described as the second phase in 
the development of the World Wide Web. It 
describes the change from a ‘web’ consisting out of 
individual websites to a full platform of interactive 
web applications to the end users on the World 
Wide Web. The Multilateralism 2.0. metaphor 
tries to grasp how the ideals and practices of 
multilateralism are currently undergoing a 
similar transformation. It is partially a descriptive 
metaphor as it tries to capture what is going on. 
But it is also a normative metaphor that points to 
what is possible and desirable.
The essence of introducing the ‘Web 2.0’ metaphor 
in international relations lies in stressing the 
emergence of network thinking and practices in 
international relations and in the transformation 
of multilateralism from a closed to an open 
system. In Multilateralism 1.0 the principal agents 
in the interstate space of international relations 
are states. National governments are the ‘star 
players’. Intergovernmental organisations are 
only dependent agents whose degrees of freedom 
only go as far as the states allow them. The 
primacy of sovereignty is the ultimate principle 
of international relations. In Multilateralism 2.0, 
there are players other than sovereign states that 
play a role and some of these players challenge the 
notion of sovereignty and that makes the system 
much more open. The trend towards multipolarity 
is more than just a redistribution of power at the 
global level. It is also about a change in who the 
players are and how the playing field is organised. 
It is symptomatic of this trend that the Harvard 
Business Review chose as one of its ‘breakthrough 
ideas’ for 2010 the concept of ‘independent 
diplomacy’ (Ross 2010). In that article the question 
was raised: why should we pretend that only 
nation-states shape international affairs? There 
are signs that Multilateralism 2.0 already partially 
exists. But of course there are also strong forces to 
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continue with Multilateralism 1.0. As such it is not 
even sure that a fully-fledged multilateral system 
version 2.0 will ever emerge.
The first characteristic of Multilateralism 2.0 is 
the diversification of multilateral organisations. In 
recent years there has been a dramatic rise of all 
kinds of international organisations and regimes. 
According to Schiavone (2001), the number of 
intergovernmental organisations has grown 
from 37 to well over 400 in the period between 
1990 and 2000 (see also Higgott 2006). While 
mostly operating on an inter-governmental basis, 
some of these organisations have acquired some 
autonomy in the exercise of their competences 
and even have a ‘legal personality’ just as states 
(Ip 2010). Increasingly these organisations look 
more to networks than to formal (bureaucratic) 
organisations. In line with a ‘trans-nationalisation 
of policies’ (Stone 2004) one can state that 
Multilateralism 2.0. implies the rise of 
transnational policy networks (Djelic & Quach 
2003, Stone 2008).
Secondly, there is a growing importance of non 
state actors at the regional rather than global 
level. States have by now created a large number 
of global and regional institutions that have 
themselves become players in the international 
order. Some of these new players, although not 
states, do resemble states in their behaviour. 
Such an institution as the EU exemplifies this 
trend (one can point for instance to its presence 
as observer in the UN, its coordination strategy at 
the International Monetary Fund, its membership 
at the G20, etc.). Other regional organisations 
are – although not to the same extent as the EU – 
following suit. As a result, one can say that we are 
currently witnessing a transition from a world of 
states to a world of states (including the BRICS as 
new global powers) and regions (Van Langenhove 
2007, 2008). This trend is further reinforced 
by the phenomenon of devolution whereby 
national powers are in some states transferred to 
subnational regions. Some of these subnational 
regional entities even have the ambition to be 
present at the international stage as well. In 
Europe, Flanders has perhaps more autonomy 
in Belgium than Luxembourg in the EU. Yet, 
Luxembourg is considered to be a sovereign state, 
while Flanders is not. In that article the question 
was raised: why to pretend that only nation-states 
shape international affairs?
Thirdly, next to the increased relations between 
‘vertical’ levels of governance, there is a growing 
interconnectivity between policy domains 
horizontally. Finance cannot be divorced 
from trade, security, climate, etc. A distinctive 
characteristic of Multilateralism 2.0. is thus that 
the boundaries between policy domains (and the 
organisations dealing with them) are becoming 
more and more permeable. Instead of clear 
separated areas of policy concern treated within 
separate institutions, there are now communities 
of different actors and layers that form together 
a global agora of multiple publics and plural 
institutions (Stone 2008).
Finally, under Multilateralism 1.0 the involvement 
of citizens is largely limited to democratic 
representation at the state level. The 
supranational governance layer does not foresee 
direct involvement of the civil society or of any 
other non-governmental actors. In Multilateralism 
2.0. there is an increased room for non-
governmental actors at all levels. This is perhaps 
the most revolutionary aspect of Multilateralism 
2.0. but also the most difficult to organise. This is 
related to the state centric and institutional focus 
of classical multilateral organisations. In such a 
closed system there is hardly any room for open 
debate, let alone for the involvement of citizens. 
But as Klabbers (2005) argued, there is evidence 
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that an alternative is emerging, that of multilateral 
institutions functioning not so much as an 
organisation but rather as an agora, that is ‘a public 
realm in which institutional issues can be debated 
and perhaps, be decided’ (Klabbers 2005: 382).
In sum, the signs are there that multilateralism 
is moving from a 1.0. mode to a 2.0. mode. But, as 
mentioned above, states have been the architects 
of Multilateralism 1.0. and they crafted a form of 
multilateralism that is in tune with state interests. 
The big challenge today is whether non state 
actors will have the power and the degrees of 
liberty to be involved in crafting Multilateralism 
2.0. Regional organisations could be in a position 
to contribute to such a new regionalised world 
order. Bull (1977: 261) already imagined such a 
‘more regionalised world systems’. More recently, 
Katzenstein (2005: 1) stated that ‘ours is a world 
of regions’. And Slaughter (2004) described a 
‘disaggregated world order’ where the model is in 
many ways the EU, that has indeed the ambition to 
be involved in such an operation. By embracing the 
principle of ‘effective multilateralism’, the EU has 
clearly indicated the willingness to contribute to 
reforming multilateralism. But the paradox might 
be that its own member states with their own 1.0. 
form of diplomacy are perhaps not ready yet for 
such a move.
Further readings
George Christou (2011), Multilateralism, Conflict 
Prevention and the Eastern Partnership, European 
Foreign Affairs Review, 16(2), pp.207-225.
George Christou & Seamus Simpson (2011), The 
European Union, Multilateralism and the Global 
Governance of Internet, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 18(2), pp. 241-257.
Luk Van Langenhove (2010) The EU as a Global 
Actor in a Multipolar World and Multilateral 
2.0. Environment, Egmont Paper, Egmont Royal 
Institute for International Affairs, nr. 36.
Luk Van Langenhove, (2010) The Transformation 
of Multilateralism. Mode 1.0. to Mode 2.0. Global 
Policy, 1(3): 263-270. (Global Policy is published by 
Wiley-Blackwell/London School of Economics)
Jan Wouters, Sijbren de Jong, and Philippe De 
Man (2010) „The EU’s Commitment to Effective 
Multilateralism in the Field of Security: Theory 
and Practice, Yearbook of European Law, vol: 29, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 164-189. 
14 15
representing an observable trend (Britz & Ojanen 
2009). According to Krahmann, security structures 
or a coalition’s fluidity and flexibility represent a 
distinctive characteristic of security governance, 
so that security coordination takes on different 
shapes (Krahmann 2001: 5). 
Of particular relevance for Kirchner is, instead, the 
working and coordinating mechanisms of security 
governance within and across issue areas. In this 
regard, co-ordination, management and regulation 
are the three components of governance and 
also the three tools used to empirically test it. 
Specifically, co-ordination concerns the way in 
which actors interact and who, among them, leads 
the policy-making process, implementation and 
control. Management relates to risk assessment 
duties, monitoring, negotiations, mediations and 
resource allocation, while regulation is conceived 
as the policy result, its intended objective, its 
fostering motivation, its effective impact and the 
institutional setting created (Kirchner 2007b: 24).
A significant part of the literature on security 
governance deals with the EU and its role therein. 
This is not surprising: Europe’s ‘post-Westphalian 
traits’ seem to be the ideal-type of a governance 
structure for several concerns, security included. 
The interdependencies that resulted from the 
internal economic project and the loss of some 
sovereign prerogatives related to that objective, 
The loose concept of governance seemed to be apt 
in capturing the idea of a variegated environment 
characterised by a multiplicity of actors and levels. 
This was especially the case with the EU given the 
multifaceted nature of its policy-making milieu. 
Webber et. al. (2004) began with some important 
definitional points, and in particular, focussed the 
analysis on security governance in Europe. That is, 
the concept was considered in part to be European 
specific, in part a socially constructed product 
of the societies and structures dominant on the 
continent, has taken these issues forward, and 
asks the important evaluative question, as to the 
way in which the concept of security governance 
can be seen to lead to offer significant advances 
on other means of thinking about the security of 
Europe.
In Kirchner’s words, security governance is an 
‘intentional system of rule that involves the 
coordination, management and regulation of 
issues by multiple and separate authorities, 
interventions by both public and private 
actors, formal and informal arrangements and 
purposefully directed towards particular policy 
outcomes’ (Kirchner 2007a: 3). A ‘governance 
approach’ should help understand vertical 
and horizontal interactions among different 
actors, serving as an organisational framework 
(Schroeder 2006: 5), analysing how security is 
produced (Webber et al. 2004) and ultimately 
Understanding security 
governance
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suggested that a certain degree of multilateral 
coordination at more levels and among different 
actors was necessary to face ongoing risks 
(Kirchner and Sperling 2007a & b). Indeed, the idea 
that global solutions to security problems can 
better be achieved through the existence and the 
practices of post-Westphalian states (Kirchner 
& Sperling 2007 a & b) spurred debates on the 
exportation of the European system of governance. 
According to this reasoning, this exportation 
could overcome some of the heterogeneity in 
the international system and set the basis for 
institutional and normative regulation of security 
challenges. However, threats can also be perceived 
and assessed differently; some actors prefer 
unilateral strategies rather than multilateral 
solutions and opt for hard tools to solve security 
matters. This is so, the argument goes, because 
some Westphalian states exist in the international 
context and characterise different systems of 
security governance from the European one: this 
ends up overburdening and complicating the 
achievement of global security (Sperling 2003, 
Hallenberg, Sperling & Wagnsson 2009).
As already stated, the literature on security 
governance is problematic in that it focuses 
predominantly on the dynamics of ‘governance’, on 
the multiplicity of actors, tools and instruments 
rather than the complexity of security and the 
implications varied meanings of security have for 
our understanding of the EU as a security actor. 
As acknowledged by its proponents, security 
governance ‘is a heuristic device for recasting 
the problem of security management in order to 
accommodate the different patterns of interstate 
interaction, the rising number of non-state 
security actors, the expansion of the security 
agenda and conflict regulation or resolution’ 
(Kirchner and Sperling 2007b: 18). Thus, the security 
governance approach, although possessing ‘the 
virtue of conceptual accommodation’ by its own 
admission, is ‘pre-theoretical’ (Ibid), and thus lacks 
nuance in terms of how the EU constructs its 
understanding of security and engages in security 
practice. Our argument, therefore, is that the 
security governance literature would benefit from 
incorporating a theoretical approach to security: 
this will provide a more complex understanding of 
the way in which security comes to be understood 
and intersubjectively defined, which in turn has 
implications for the relevant actors involved, 
governance strategies, processes of engagement, 
and finally, policy practice and outcome.  
Another potential shortcoming of the security 
governance literature is its predominantly 
Euro-centric contextual focus. Our argument 
here is that in order to understand the EU as 
an actor in security governance structures, a 
more global outlook is required to incorporate 
other dimensions and influences in the framing 
of EU/European security issues and practices, 
and on how they are constructed, managed and 
regulated. On this point, a significant step has 
been taken by Sperling (2003, 2009). He envisages 
the possible existence of different systems of 
security governance characterised by the following 
features which include: the regulator, considering 
the mechanisms adopted to face security problems 
and resolve conflicts; the normative framework, 
identifying the role that norms play in determining 
interests and behaviours; sovereign prerogatives, 
investigating the degree of hierarchical 
interactions; and the security referent, defining 
the nature of the state, the interaction between 
identity and interests and the usefulness of force, 
and the interaction context, investigating the 
strength of the security dilemma (Sperling 2009). 
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In our view, this is a productive way forward which 
aims at overcoming the strict European focus of 
current research, whilst simultaneously dealing 
with the EU’s role in different security structures, 
and adding a comparative perspective to the 
analysis of EU security governance. 
In this context, our contribution would not only 
be in acknowledging that overlapping systems 
of security governance have implications for the 
EU, but also in laying down the methodological 
foundations to investigate how and why the EU 
can interact within them, and contribute to the 
sustainability, transformation or dissolution of 
such arrangements. Moreover, it moves beyond 
a pre-theoretical, functional aggregation of 
factors and characteristics of systems of security 
governance (and states within them) to ask critical 
questions of how they were constructed in the first 
place, and how this impacts on the way in which 
the EU can speak and do security. In summary then, 
whilst there is an acknowledgment in the latest 
European security governance literature of the 
security referent, the role of norms and the context 
of interaction – which is also of interest within 
our approach – there remains limited discussion 
on what is meant by security per se, or how it 
can be understood theoretically and explored 
methodologically in the context of the EU and 
Europe.     
How then, do we propose to take security 
governance forward and move it from a pre-
theoretical to theoretical framework of analysis? 
To reiterate, our argument is that we must move 
beyond characterisations and typologies towards 
a clear theoretical and methodological foundation. 
More specifically, we contend that there is a need 
to take the constructivist turn in security studies 
seriously in order to allow us to move beyond 
security as an objective phenomenon that is ‘out 
there’ and can be measured or analysed through 
a linear or deductive methodology. We also argue 
in this context that a more obvious synergy 
with the security studies literature will enhance 
the analytical sophistication of the security 
governance literature.
Whilst the EU/European security governance 
literature certainly provides a plastic or flexible 
frame for this purpose, it falls short in our eyes, 
as it does not move beyond a conceptual notion 
of security (it is pre-theoretical). The suggestion 
here, therefore, is that through utilising the 
security studies literature, we can provide a flexible 
framework and a comparative methodology, which 
moves beyond traditional notions of security 
as the activity of states; a notion that is fixed or 
defined simply as a threat, and provides a more 
complex understanding of how the EU does and 
speaks security. We recognise that for many such 
a comparative or eclectic approach is problematic 
on a philosophical and intellectual level, but our 
position merely suggests that there is much to 
connect such theories (although not to collapse 
them into one theoretical approach, see Floyd 
2007) – and that, whilst not compatible in terms 
of the methodological minutiae can at an intuitive 
and comparative level illuminate the problems in 
each, whilst also providing a platform for dialogue 
and theory building.
Thus, it is not the assertion here that security 
governance is not a fruitful avenue for 
research. Indeed, we very much concur with 
the conceptualisation of security governance 
provided in this literature and its notion of 
European security as part of broader regional and 
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global security governance structures. However, 
we do believe that it lacks a more complex 
understanding of the variegated meaning of 
security and security logics in the context of the 
EU/Europe. Our approach, therefore, almost takes 
a step backwards in its conversation with this 
literature – in that it seeks first to analyse the 
discursive construction of ‘security’ in different 
policy areas, whilst also not losing sight of the 
connection between construction, governance/
governmentality, policy practice and outcome. 
Overall, we suggest this is a more nuanced 
approach which allows the analyst to probe the 
dynamics of EU security action, and indeed, the 
implications and consequences of such action in 
terms of policy governance, effectiveness and its 
own identity.  
Further readings
EU-GRASP researchers George Christou and Stuart 
Croft edited a special issue on European ‘security’ 
governance with the Taylor and Francis journal 
“European Security”. This collection contains 
ten contributions on a wide range of security 
governance issues.
In 2012, this special issue of European Security will 
also be published as a book by Routledge under the 
title of European ‘security’ governance (edited by 
George Christou and Stuart Croft).
In 2012, Routledge will also publish a volume 
in their Routledge/ECPR Studies in European 
Political Science Series on the topic of The EU and 
Multilateral Security Governance. The volume will 
be edited by Luk Van Langenhove, Sonia Lucarelli 
and Jan Wouters.
18 19
time allowing for the inclusion of a larger definition 
of security and the means put in place by a variety 
of actors to address various security issues. In this 
framework, security governance can therefore help 
to understand the proliferation of transnational 
cooperation amongst both state and non-state 
actors in the post-Cold War era, where new security 
threats are challenging the ability of sovereign 
states to ensure the security of their citizens.
To evaluate the successes and failures of the EU 
as a global actor in security and peace requires an 
analysis of EU action at multiple levels of security 
governance. Instructively, it should be noted 
that the EU is not a single state. Consequently, 
the EU can be understood as a geographical 
“region” and/or an integrated set of institutions 
that create a multilevel and multilocational 
foreign policy  (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 
8-34). This creates two significant problems for 
understanding bilateral relations. Firstly, as the 
EU is itself a region, bilateral relations constitute 
“regional-state relations”. This has led to Heiner 
Hänggi going beyond the term bilateralism, and 
referring to EU bilateral interactions with single 
powers as ‘hybrid interregionalism’  (2000: 7). 
“Hybrid interregionalism” refers to a framework 
where one organised region negotiates with a 
group of countries from another (unorganised 
or dispersed) region. For instance, in the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) the 
Mediterranean countries negotiate individually 
Developments characterising the rapidly 
evolving global environment are reflected in 
the ‘Multilateralism 2.0.’ concept. The latter 
emphasises the diversification of multilateral 
actors and the ensuing diversification of 
multilateral playing fields. The concept accounts 
for a complex network of actors that perform 
and interact in a multipolar environment, where 
openness and flexibility are the keywords. The EU 
is a part of this multipolar environment where 
it plays a role not as a state but as a regional 
organisation operating in a complex international 
environment comprising states, multilateral 
and regional organisations. The EU itself, in its 
relations with other actors, is characterised by its 
multi-faceted appearances as one can distinguish 
elements of bilateral, regional, interregional and 
global actorness. As such, the EU contributes 
to establishing a fluid architecture of global, 
regional and national solutions to security threats 
that embody different actors at multiple levels 
according to the challenges that need to be 
addressed. Within such a fluid architecture, there 
are no fixed roles or positions for any actor - hence 
the growing need for coordination, management 
and regulation. Not surprisingly then, there 
emerged the new concept of ‘security governance’, 
which focuses on how multiple actors in a web 
of power and responsibility coordinate, manage 
and regulate their actions. The concept of security 
governance is therefore useful to overcome the 
conundrum of state-centrism while at the same 
Levels of cooperation
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with the EU. Similarly, referring specifically to 
commercial relations, Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004) 
take the Lomé Agreement as an example of hybrid 
interregionalism, whereby the EU is unified and 
has trade relations with a set of countries that are 
not grouped within their own customs union or 
free trade agreement. Hänggi goes beyond formal 
frameworks and refers to hybrid interregionalism, 
in which a region, such as the EU, interacts 
bilaterally with single powers. Formally, this can 
be thought of as a “region-to-state” (or “region-to-
country”) relationship.
In its broader sense, interregionalism refers to the 
process whereby two specified regions interact 
as regions, that is, region-to-region relations. The 
most institutionalised form of interregionalism, 
so-called “pure interregionalism”, develops 
between two clearly identifiable regions within an 
institutional framework (for instance the EU and 
the African Union). Pure interregionalism captures, 
however, only a limited part of present-day 
interregional cooperation. This is because many 
“regions” are dispersed and porous, without clearly 
identifiable borders, and demonstrate only a low 
level of regional agency. In other words, regional 
organisations are not discrete actors, which can 
be isolated from classical intergovernmental 
cooperation between nation-states (i.e. classical 
bilateralism). It is widely contested among scholars 
even to what extent the EU (sophisticated as it is) 
should be considered a discrete actor. Although 
interregionalism is not explicitly mentioned 
as an objective in the Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU), it is deeply rooted in the European 
Commission’s and the EU’s foreign policies and 
external relations. There is a long history of a 
rather loose form of interregionalism between the 
EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
group of countries, and this interregional policy 
has been partly revised under the new Cotonou 
Agreement and other frameworks. Since the 
1990s interregional cooperation has been further 
developed as a key feature of the EU’s foreign 
policies with other counterpart regions, at least 
in official declarations. Indeed, we are witnessing 
a trend whereby the European Commission and 
other European policymakers seek to promote 
interregional relations and partnerships with the 
Global South, albeit not always with a consistent 
formulation (Söderbaum & Stålgren 2010).
Our analysis of the EU’s interregional cooperation 
with Africa, Latin America and Asia reveals 
that the EU uses a variety of instruments and 
models of engagement to foster relations with 
countries and regional partners. As we have 
seen, EU-driven interregional cooperation tends 
to be multifaceted, with different issues and 
themes receiving different emphasis in different 
counterpart regions and in different security 
issues. Interregional policy is, therefore, not a 
fixed set of guidelines but rather is subject to 
adaptation. A comparative assessment suggests 
a variation in the way that the EU conducts 
its foreign policies towards different regions 
(Söderbaum & Stålgren 2010).
This implies that the EU does not appear to have 
a specific preference for one particular model of 
cooperation. It is evident that the EU tends to be 
pragmatic in its various relationships with the rest 
of the world. In this regard, the EU increasingly 
behaves as an actor on a variety of levels in world 
affairs — having “a global strategy” (Farrell 2010, 
Söderbaum & Stålgren 2010). Far from being locked 
into a specific foreign policy doctrine (such as 
interregionalism), the EU uses any type of policy 
that it has at its disposal and which appears to be 
most suited to a given objective. 
20 21
It is useful to distinguish between security 
issues and other types of (non-security) issues, 
such as trade, aid and development. Needless to 
say, security and development may affect one 
another. Together forming the much-talked about 
security-development nexus. Yet, it is also relevant 
to point out that generally speaking interregional 
cooperation is quite often more developed in the 
field of trade, aid and development compared to 
security. 
A general characteristic of interregional 
cooperation (both in the security and non-security 
sphere) is that issues are often dealt with through 
multi-country dialogues, summits and policy 
declarations. Interregionalism may therefore be 
criticised as rhetorical, symbolic and sweeping. 
In contrast, however, there is also evidence that 
interregionalism may provide a useful forum for 
dialogue and framework for enhancing cooperation 
at lower levels. In this way, interregionalism may 
reinforce bilateral collaboration, or may be a 
stepping-stone to multilateral cooperation. As 
a result it is not useful to analyse interregional 
cooperation in isolation from other forms 
of cooperation. There is a tendency that 
interregionalism sometimes is important even if it 
is not so well-developed or intense. 
Our research result reveal that it is misleading 
to only concentrate on pure interregionalism, 
that is, institutionalised cooperation between 
two regional organisations. The more complex 
and pluralistic processes of transregionalism and 
hybrid interregionalism reveal that especially 
the counterpart regional organisations are more 
open-ended and ambiguous, implying that policies 
of regional organisations interact with policies of 
states/governments. Taken together, this leads 
to the possibility of an increasing number of 
(interacting) forms of collaboration on different 
“levels” (hence the relevance of transversal 
cooperation as an analytical device). 
The interregional model is perhaps most developed 
in the EU’s relationship with Africa, at least in 
the sense that interregional cooperation and 
partnerships exist in most issue-areas and with 
Africa as well as all sub-regional organisations. 
Yet, it is very evident that EU-Africa interregional 
cooperation is dominated by the EU and to quite 
a large extent it depends on the EU’s interests and 
agenda. This is however not equivalent to saying 
that asymmetric interregionalism is necessarily 
detrimental. And it is not simply that EU dictates 
the agenda. For example, many observers 
would say that the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) is African-driven and EU-Africa 
interregional cooperation is to a large extent 
designed in order to strengthen APSA and African 
management of its own security crises. 
EU-Asia collaboration is at least partly different in 
terms of the degree of institutionalisation as well 
as the nature of the issues covered. For instance, 
terrorism and WMD are greater concerns in Asia 
than in Africa and Latin America, whereas Africa 
is heavily affected by a large number of regional 
conflicts. But interregionalism in Asia is clearly 
affected by the fact that ASEAN is more or less the 
only viable regional organisation. But the EU is not 
necessarily advocating in favour of increased pure 
interregionalism. On the contrary, while in the past 
the EU has combined pure interregionalism with 
forms of hybrid interregionalism, there is today 
a growing preference for hybrid interregionalism 
and more flexible solutions. “This may be explained 
in part by the difficulty of negotiating over very 
complex and politically contentious issues with 
disparate groups of countries. The EU has found 
that the difficulty of completing such negotiations, 
and the subsequent problems in implementation 
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and compliance, make different forms of region-
state treaties a more  effective instrument for 
economic cooperation” (Farrell 2010). Hence, 
despite the many official declarations about 
the EU’s preference for interregional relations, 
a closer empirical review reveals a complex 
pattern of intersecting, complementing and at 
times competing models of external relations - 
resulting in a mixture of bilateral, multilateral and 
interregional policies in a world with external and 
internal obstacles.
Previous research suggests that the EU’s policy 
mix depends very much on who the counterpart 
is (Söderbaum & Stålgren 2010). We argue that 
this variation in interregional relations is often 
linked to questions of relevance and power. The 
EU cannot deny the contemporary relevance and 
power of key East Asian states which results in 
partnerships that are symmetric in nature. This 
contrasts sharply with the EU-Africa relationship, 
which, although officially designated as an equal 
partnership, for now at least clearly remains 
asymmetrical (CEC 2004: 9). Compared to the more 
flexible and pluralistic approach to Asia, the EU 
tends to emphasise the interregional and regional 
model much more strongly in the African context.
A similar asymmetry, although not as one-sided, 
can also be detected in the EU’s relationship 
with Latin America. This suggests that, while 
much of the EU’s interregional relations are 
conducted under the pretext of mutual benefit, 
the distribution of these benefits appears to be a 
function of the power position of the EU relative 
to its counterparts. That is, the stronger the 
counterpart (in terms of power and relevance), 
the more concessions are made by the EU. With 
weaker “partners”, the EU seem to dictate far more 
of the conditions for interregional cooperation. 
The relatively stronger East Asian region benefits 
from access to European markets and Asian 
countries are generally invited to participate in 
equal or symmetric partnerships with the EU. 
There is little conditionality attached to East Asian 
cooperation, which reflects the EU’s response to 
an increasingly powerful region. Indeed, security 
issues, such as human rights are sensitive for 
many Asian countries and the EU has chosen 
to maintain a rather low profile on these issues 
instead of pressurising for political changes. 
However, the EU attaches economic, trade and 
political conditionalities in its dealings with Africa. 
The EU’s dealings with Latin America appear to lie 
somewhere between these extremes.
Further reading
In 2012, Springer Verlag will publish a volume 
edited by Fredrik Söderbaum, Tiziana Scaramagli 
and Francis Baert that goes deeper into the notion 
of interregionalism and the interaction between 
the different levels of transversal cooperation as 
researcherd in EU-GRASP: bilateralism, regionalism, 
interregionalism and multilateralism. This volume 
will be published in the United Nations University 
series on Regionalism.
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was established in order to better coordinate the 
implementation and conduct of the CFSP but 
gradually has expanded to encompass additional 
functions including the post of Secretary General 
of the Council of the European Union.
It is in his position of High Representative/
Secretary General (HR/SG) that Javier Solana was 
tasked by EU foreign ministers to draft a ‘European 
strategic concept’. The result was the publication 
of the document “A Secure Europe in a Better 
World. European Security Strategy” in 2003 and 
its adoption by the European Council during its 
meeting in December of the same year. The ESS 
represents the document leading the way for what 
European foreign policy should be like. In other 
words, “it outlines the long-term policy objectives 
and the instruments that can be applied to achieve 
them” and therefore “it could indeed serve as a 
reference framework for day-to-day policy-making, 
defining also the legitimacy of actions and 
leading the development of capabilities within 
the EU” (Biscop & Drieskens 2006: 271). Among 
the various elements contained in the document 
it is noteworthy to stress the call it makes for 
increasing collaboration with international 
organisations and cooperation with major actors 
of the international scene. Within the part 
dedicated to the Strategic Objectives of the ESS 
special attention is thus given to multilateralism 
by calling for ‘An International Order Based on 
Effective Multilateralism’. The 2008 review of 
Since the creation of Europe, security and defence 
concerns have been both of primary importance 
and highly controversial. Early attempts to set up 
a defence union were largely unsuccessful. The 
emergence of new security threats at the end 
of the Cold War provoked a renewed interest in 
security and defence-related issues. In parallel, 
the setting into place of the basis of the EU’s 
foreign policy dates back to the early 1990s. At the 
time, the mutations of the European institutions, 
and the world they were evolving in, called for a 
profound review of the way the European foreign 
policy should be organised. As such, the Maastricht 
Treaty represents  an important milestone with 
the introduction of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). The Title V of the Treaty 
which established the CFSP as one of the three 
pillars of the European Union represents a turning 
point for the European integration process since 
it calls for an institutionalisation of cooperation 
of the member states’ foreign policies. The CFSP 
essentially marks the attempt by the member 
states to resolve their lack of coordination when 
faced with a crisis situation. The conflict ensuing 
from the breakdown of Yugoslavia clearly showed 
the need for an institutional framework to guide 
the various European foreign policies and favour 
common positions rather than disaggregated 
responses to similar crises. The Amsterdam Treaty 
further reinforced the CFSP by creating the 
position of a High Representative of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. Initially the position 
European structure 
and policies
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the European Security Strategy also clearly 
underscores the fact that the EU has to work in 
favour of multilateralism and in collaboration with 
international institutions. The Review states that 
“At a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of 
the multilateral order. The UN stands at the apex 
of the international system.” It also adds that 
the EU finds itself at “a unique moment to renew 
multilateralism, working with the United States 
and with [its] partners around the world.”
The signing of the Lisbon Treaty marks yet another 
important step in the integration of Europe, 
as with its adoption the EU aims to improve 
coherence in its external actions and, at the same 
time, enhance its accountability towards European 
citizens. The most relevant innovations related 
to the Union’s global actorness concern, first, 
the appointment of a President of the European 
Council, to give more visibility and consistency to 
both ‘the work of the European Council’ and ‘the 
external representation of the union on the CFSP 
issues’ (Article 9B paragraph 6, Treaty of Lisbon). 
Second, the creation of a ‘High Representative 
(HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy’ – called the ‘EU Minister of Foreign Affairs’ 
– who is also Vice-President of the Commission, 
and thus responsible for the coordination between 
the Council and the Commission. Third, the 
introduction of a European External Action Service 
(EEAS) to assist the HR and streamline the EU’s 
external services by representing the Union in 
non-EU countries on all matters of foreign policy. 
Fourth, by conferring legal personality onto the 
EU (Article 46A), the Lisbon Treaty enables the 
Union to sign treaties or international agreements 
falling under the competences transferred to the 
EU by its member states. Finally, the Lisbon Treaty 
also streamlines decision-making procedures by 
extending the use of Qualified Majority Votes for 
matters pertaining to the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), thus demonstrating the EU’s 
willingness to facilitate decision-making among 
the 27 member states. Although these innovations 
do not challenge CFSP’s intergovernmental 
nature at its core, they nevertheless affirm the 
EU’s commitment in improving its efficiency and 
coherence at the international level.
The EU has therefore continuously strengthened 
its organisational structures with the Lisbon Treaty 
only representing one of the latest stage – albeit a 
major one – that installed some major changes and 
innovations, while at the same time stepping up 
its global presence. This has also been witnessed 
very practically as since 2003 more than 22 civilian 
and military missions have been carried out by 
the EU in the Balkans, the Middle East, Asia and 
Africa. Therefore, in terms of civilian and military 
capacity, these missions deployed under the ESDP 
demonstrated a certain EU potential. However, 
military capability, be it human or material, is still 
generally insufficient. Despite the absence of an 
EU standing army, standby battlegroups have 
been settled as well-trained and -equipped forces 
that can be deployed on short notice. Further, the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation constitutes 
a remarkable attempt aimed at tackling the 
capability deficit. But an issue that remains 
to be dealt with is the absence of a common 
operational structure for coordinating efforts and 
deployments on the ground.
Despite this demonstrated ability, we cannot 
forget that the EU is not a state but a regional 
organisation that operates in a complex 
international environment comprising states, 
multilateral organisations as well as other 
regional organisations. The willingness of the 
EU to involve itself in international peace and 
security and address the threats it is faced 
with has thus been translated in the structure 
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and policies it has adopted to respond to these 
threats. Of course, the structures and policies 
are not uniform and largely depend on the threat 
they are meant to tackle. Nevertheless, some 
common features can be identified and most 
importantly is the EU’s readiness to engage with 
other international actors and act in favor of an 
effective multilateralism. Secondly, the EU also 
shows elements of bilateral, regional, interregional 
and global actorness. As such, the EU contributes 
to establishing a fluid architecture of security 
governance spanning from the global, the regional 
and the national levels and that embodies 
different actors at multiple levels according to the 
problems that need to be faced.
For example, in what concern energy security, 
international energy network projects serving the 
EU’s security of energy supply necessarily involve 
the agreement of third country governments 
as internal developments in the EU energy 
markets cannot be considered in isolation from 
external matters, namely the EU’s existing 
arrangements with supplier states (Benford 
2006: 41). It is therefore important that the EU’s 
international cooperation framework encourages 
the development of projects with third country 
governments. In this field of external relations the 
EU currently holds Memoranda of Understanding 
on energy with a number of third countries, as 
well as so-called ‘Energy Dialogues’. The EU-Russia 
Energy Dialogue takes on a particularly important 
role in this regard given the strong mutual interest 
and interdependence in the energy field between 
the EU and Russia, in particular regarding the 
supply of natural gas and (to a lesser degree) with 
respect to oil. The EU offers the largest consumer 
market for Russian gas and Russia not only 
oversees the largest natural gas reserves but also 
exercises full control over the key pipelines that 
provide the main access to these reserves. The 
EU’s broad challenge thus becomes managing this 
interdependence with a view to gaining maximum 
control over outcomes, namely ensuring security of 
supply (Benford 2006: 42).
Further reading
Wouters, Jan, Bijlmakers, Stephanie & Meuwissen, 
Katrien (2012) The EU as an Multilateral Security 
Actor after Lisbon: Constitutional and Institutional 
Aspects. In: Lucarelli, Sonia, Van Langenhove, Luk 
and Wouters, Jan (eds.) The EU and Multilateral 
Security Governance. London: Routledge.
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Impact and acceptance
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immediate and long-term, short-term and lasting 
efforts of the effort’ (quoted in Woodrow & 
Chigas, 2008, 19). Importantly, ‘if projects are not 
accountable for how their interventions contribute 
to the broader peace, one runs the risk of investing 
a lot of time, resources, and effort in programmes 
with excellent outcomes, but that make no 
measurable difference to the conflict’ (ibid).
Impact assessment is a difficult task. Research 
has shown that in terms of actually measuring 
the results and impact of peacebuilding some of 
the most important (methodological) weaknesses 
include: the general lack of planning (i.e. a conflict 
analysis was often missing as a foundation to 
develop and implement the intervention); often 
there is a weak connection between the conflict 
analysis and intervention itself (and in some cases 
the conflict analysis is completely missing); the 
goals of intervention are often so general and 
vague (‘contribution to peace’) that they are not 
measurable, and it is very difficult to evaluate 
their impact (Spurk 2008, Woodrow & Chigas 
2008). Hence, a proper impact assessment requires 
planning and conflict analysis (including the extent 
of regionalisation of conflict). The intervention 
thus needs to be planned and designed before it is 
implemented (it is at least very difficult to get solid 
answers about impact when such assessments 
are carried out in retrospect). Furthermore, impact 
assessment requires understanding of causality, 
Any meaningful assessment of the impact and 
acceptance of EU’s role as a global-regional 
actor in security and peace must begin with 
an identification of the EU’s goals and the 
underlying assumptions of the EU’s involvement 
in a particular intervention (i.e. the EU’s 
construction of the conflict). The next step is 
to distinguish between output, outcome and 
impact. As mentioned in the section on security 
governance, there is an abundance of literature 
on the intervention strategy and processes of 
implementation in a rather narrow sense. Indeed, 
literature in the field is heavily geared towards 
‘output’ (e.g. training of soldiers in human rights) 
and ‘outcome’ (e.g. soldiers are respecting human 
rights in their activities) of interventions, rather 
than whether any peacebuilding impact on the 
society in a broader sense can be detected. 
The societal impact is particularly relevant for 
assessing more comprehensive interventions (even 
if some evaluators and researchers claim that 
only output and outcome should be assessed, not 
impact). However, as pointed out by Woodrow and 
Chigas (2008), impact needs not be elusive and 
unreachable, too long-term or impossible to assess, 
but can be identifiable in everyday occurrences. 
Such understanding is also consistent with the 
OECD-DAC’s definition of impact as including: 
‘the primary and secondary, direct and indirect, 
positive and negative, intended and unintended, 
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or at least ‘a convincing estimate of causal 
relationship’ (Svensson & Brattberg 2008: 24), and 
this requires ‘a theory of change’, which is able to 
explain how and why a particular intervention will 
contribute to broader peace and security. Impact 
is frequently expressed in terms of the success 
or failure of an intervention. There is however no 
consensus among academics, policy makers or 
recipients of intervention as to what constitutes or 
explains successful intervention; assessments are 
subject to bias and politicisation. Our framework 
seeks to problematise the way the EU defines the 
success or failure of its engagements. We need 
to acknowledge a general weakness of the way 
success and failure is defined and how impact 
is assessed. The first general weakness is that 
interventions are often predicated upon very 
sweeping definitions of ‘successful’ outcomes, and 
are justified with morally charged and normative 
propositions by interveners, such as human 
rights, human security and the responsibility to 
protect. The strategies adopted by interveners 
are justified on the basis that they lead to greater 
security, stability and development of the targets 
of intervention and/or of the global community. 
Such rhetoric usually emerges from a western 
philosophical tradition (Der Derian 1995) that 
clothes raw economic and political interest. 
Notions of success are thus deeply embedded in 
cultural values and politico-economic interests; 
they are always ambiguous, meaning one thing 
for those loyal to the values of a global ‘outsider’ 
community, and another for those who identify 
themselves as ‘insiders’ (Rubinstein 2005). Notably, 
the values and understandings of those for whom 
the impact of intervention is experienced as 
largely excluded from interveners’ definitions and 
measures of success.
This behaviour can be explained by the fact that 
it is politically expedient for interveners to claim 
that their initiative has been successful, regardless 
of its real effects. Many broad-based international 
interventions arise from the assumptions of the 
‘liberal peace’ model – that democratisation, 
human rights, liberal market economics and the 
integration of societies into the global community 
bring peace and stability (MacMillan 1998). 
Success then tends to be measured according to 
how closely these objectives have been achieved, 
rather than according to how intervention has 
impacted upon the everyday worlds of the targets 
of intervention – particularly the less visible. By 
paying attention to actors that are usually invisible 
in the formulation of success and failure, we seek 
to problematise prevailing conceptualisations 
and discourses of success and the frameworks 
of analysis, design and evaluation that sustain 
them. Finally, impact assessment then needs to 
be related to the effect on the EU’s identity and 
projection as a peace and security actor. Thereby, 
we are able to identify both sides of the coin: one 
that identifies the actual output, outcome and 
impact in terms of increased peace and security 
in the regional conflict itself, and the other that 
identifies the status of the EU’s capacity and 
identity as a global peace and security actor.
The case of the EU as a defender of human 
rights has also been affected by the unexpected 
outcomes of some of its own policies most notably 
in its handling of migration. The prevalent security 
approach undertaken by the EU and Member 
states presents weaknesses on many fronts. First 
of all, some of the EU’s practices regarding the 
removal of irregular refugees are often found to 
breach human rights conventions. EU’s practice of 
relying on third states and authoritarian regimes 
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to help establish a more effective migration 
control regime often tends to conflict with such 
international law principles as non refoulement. In 
several cases, guarantees given by such states and 
regimes have proved not to be worth the paper on 
which they are written. 
While the view is widely held that there is need 
to strenghen capacities in refugee-generating 
countries, the process which the EU has adopted 
has so far not yielded desired results. Collaborative 
activities between the EU and USA (such as data-
sharing, screening and profiling etc,) arguably 
geared towards a more robust migration control 
often lead to allegations of “fortress Europe-USA”. 
In some instances, such practices have been 
perceived as encouraging discriminarory practices. 
The EU’s strategy for handling its anti terrorism 
campaign has not fared well either. Quite naturally, 
the EU’s strong subscription to democratic values 
means that it eschews the use of violence to 
canvass political views. Consequently, the EU 
discountenances entities such as Hamas, the 
PKK given their propensity to adopting violent 
means to press home their demands. However, 
the drawback of this strategy is that what some 
might regard as the legitimate democratic claims 
(and one might say, gains) of such entities Hamas, 
for instance, its winning a democratic election, are 
perfunctorily ignored or rebuffed by the EU which 
prefers to deal with the entity from a security 
premises.
The EU-standards begin to unravel. However, 
when one considers its approach to entities that 
seemingly fall into the same cauldron as Hamas. 
A case in point here will be the manner in which 
the EU often responds to the Russian/Chechen 
crisis, especially regarding terrorist attacks by 
one on another. When a terrorist attack on the 
Chechen Parliament occurred in October 2010, the 
EU’s appeal for a greater cooperation with Russia 
in fighting international terrorism fell on deaf 
hears in Moscow: the Russian leadership believed 
that the EU favoured Chechen campaign against 
Russia’s stability.
That said, one should not underestimate 
some of the immediate impacts that the EU’s 
involvement has had. This is particularly so in its 
direct engagment on the ground either through 
its delivering of humanitarian aid (as was the 
case in the Gaza strip for example) or through 
the deployment of fully fledged ESDP missions 
(as was the case with the deployment of EUFOR 
Chad/CAR). With these instruments the EU has 
effectively been able to address some of the 
security problems even though it has been at a 
very local level and usually within a limited time-
span linked to the duration of the mission itself. 
Focusing on the EU missions deployed under 
the Common Security and Defence Policy, those 
being designed as short-term interventions can 
be assessed positively. Both the EUFOR Chad/CAR 
mission and Artemis in the DRC had very limited 
mandates focusing mainly on the stabilisation 
of the security conditions and the improvement 
of the humanitarian situation in a geographically 
confined area within a short-time period. However, 
those missions seen within a rather long-term 
perspective and broader mandate are considered 
to be less efficient and successful.
For the European Union to establish itself as 
a globally recognised leader, its acceptance by 
external actors and international organisations is 
essential. Effectiveness and consistency are highly 
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relevant in this context, as bad performance will 
cast doubts about the capacity and willingness of 
the EU.
In terms of cooperation with regional 
organisations, the situation in the Horn of Africa 
highlights that although the AU and the IGAD 
generally welcome the cooperation with the 
EU, there are difficulties to cope both with the 
EU’s demands and expectations. Furthermore, 
approaches followed by the EU do not necessarily 
conform to the position held by the AU or IGAD 
as the example of Omar al-Bashir’s indictment 
by the ICC highlights. While the EU supports his 
indictment, the AU’s and IGAD’s position is that 
this has made negotiations on the conflict in 
Darfur more difficult and problematic. In addition, 
Sudan has become even less willing to cooperate 
with the EU, for example withdrawing from the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement. In contrast to 
the African cases,  the impact of EU’s security 
governance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
manifests itself in the way the EU is understood 
by the core parties of the conflict. Thus, the Israelis 
believe that the EU is supporting the Palestinian 
Authority while the Palestinian Authority in turn 
believes that the EU supports Israel. In other 
words, the impact can be understood as distrust 
for the EU by both core parties to the conflict. 
Furthermore, any success in outcome, output 
or impact is diminished by bureaucratic 
ineffectiveness resulting from the complex 
and demanding institutional set-up of the 
EU. Although the EU tries to be present on 
the ground not least through its Commission 
Delegations, inadequate exchange of information 
between the Delegations hampers effective 
policy implementation. Also increasing the 
ineffectiveness of EU’s security governance are 
the hierarchical and complicated relationships 
between Brussels and the field level due to the 
multitude of actors, an overlap of bilateral and EU 
policies and top-down approaches from Brussels. 
All this is further exacerbated by weak staff 
competence which implies that there are mainly 
inexperienced junior employees deployed to the 
most difficult settings where senior experts avoid 
to be deployed due to the difficult working and 
living conditions. 
While the EU is resolute in its fight against 
terrorism and commitment to democratic 
governance, the Union has not been able to 
translate these ideals into support for those 
who desire them most. Rather, its machinery for 
social and political transformation continues to 
target elitist networks of government officials. 
Activists in Egypt and across the Mediterranean 
have been attempting to fill in this void through 
the flourishing of an independent civil society 
and other social networks: In the case of Egypt, 
bloggers have been quite efficient in this regard. 
Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan formed the Agadir 
Initiative in 2002 to provide for free trade 
between these four countries, with the European 
Commission providing technical support for its 
implementation. Underlying such an initiative is 
however the flawed assumption that somehow 
economic development will automatically lead 
to political change, stability and security in the 
Mediterranean. This has been the ‘European talk’ 
and message that Arab regimes have been only too 
happy to oblige and transmit to their societies. 
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With regard to human rights violations, the 
EU’s handling of human rights issue reveals 
inconsistencies and double standards in its 
actual policies for the promotion of human 
rights, especially in the haphazard use of CFSP 
instruments (2001). On a number of occasions, 
analysts have demonstrated how the widely 
heralded goal of human rights’ protection and 
promotion has been sidelined due to other 
(more compelling) interests, such as economic 
advantages, commercial gains and security 
(Olsen 2000, Youngs 2001, Balfour 2006). Not 
surprisingly, the EU has traditionally shown a 
greater zeal in resorting to punitive measures for 
violations of human rights in those regions of the 
world where it has ‘the upper hand’, particularly 
in the ‘poor, marginal countries’ of sub-Saharan 
Africa (Smith 2001: 193). In spite of differences 
and contradictions, the EU’s discourse appears 
to have been coherent at least in so far as it has 
lived up to the ‘people first’ principle underlying 
the human security doctrine. However, when it 
comes to criticising and holding human rights 
abusers accountable, the EU’s double standards 
manifest more conspicuously, thus undermining 
its credibility as a human right defender. 
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new multilateralism will no longer be the exclusive 
preserve of states, nor will it be hierarchically 
organised in highly institutionalised organisations. 
The proliferation of multilateral regimes in the last 
two decades is shaping a ‘Multilateralism Mode 
2.0’ characterised by the diversification of both the 
multilateral playing fields and multilateral actors. 
This more open multilateral system brings with it 
more opportunities for the EU. To take advantage 
of them, however, it needs to first come to grips 
with a new situation where asymmetries, variable 
geometries and one of a kind agreements will be 
the rule, rather than the exception. The EU must 
be steady in its promotion of multilateralism as 
an ideal, but extremely flexible in its multilateral 
practice, and find ways – for which EU governance 
seems particularly well fitted compared to the 
traditional diplomacies – to engage with legitimate 
sub national, multinational and transnational 
non state actors and their networks. At the same 
time, it must find innovative ways to address 
the problems of absent, competing, obsolete or 
ineffective multilateral structures that exist both 
at the regional and global level.
2. DEAlInG WIth A mUltIPolAR WoRlD oF 
REGIonS. 
When engaging with regional organisations the 
dream of a ‘world of regions’ modeled on the image 
of the EU often results in a fixation on institutional 
questions, as a consequence, when institutions 
are absent or fail, a lack of strategic vision. The 
In July 2007, the European Commission issued 
a call for proposals, on the theme of EU and 
multilateralism, within the Social Sciences and the 
Humanities of the Seventh Framework Programme 
for Research & Innovation. Three proposals were 
selected, each of them bringing together an 
international partnership of research institutions. 
Each team worked differently, adopting different 
approaches and methods. At the end of the three 
years, the projects known as Mercury, EU -GRASP 
and EU4Seas, jointly hosted the “Global Europe 
Conference on Multilateralism” held in Brussels 
on 7 October 2011. This final conference was 
an opportunity to share, discuss and converge 
ideas, and to present the projects’ findings to 
practitioners and stakeholders. The conference 
adopted a joint Policy Brief entitled “The EU and 
Multilateralism: Nine Recommendations” which 
articulated some nine policy recommendations:
1. thE EU mUSt ADAPt to chAnGInG GloBAl 
mUltIlAtERAlISm. 
The redistribution of power on a global scale and 
in wider Europe, pushed by the emergence of 
new centres of power and the urgency of global 
challenges (the financial crisis, climate change, 
maritime security, to name a few), highlights the 
need for more robust forms of multilateralism 
that deliver global public goods and contain 
emerging rivalries. But the main assumptions 
about global multilateralism need to change: the 
The EU and multilateralism: 
nine recommendations
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kind of institutional support that has benefitted 
both small subregional organisations, such as the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and much larger 
ones, such as the African Union, are investments 
that should not be lightly abandoned. But the 
EU institutions must be flexible enough to work 
with other institutional structures or simply to 
create alliances with groups of countries that are 
promoting multilateral solutions in their regions 
and on the global scale, such as those of Latin 
America and of Africa. The parallel between the 
EU and other regional organisations, however, 
should not be replaced with a tendency to see 
the EU in constant comparison with the USA 
and the emerging powers, trying to act as their 
mirror image, or adopting their behaviour and, 
even less, their interpretation of power. The sui 
generis character of the EU is a strength in global 
multilateralism, and should not be abandoned 
lightly.
3. IntERnAl DEcISIon-mAkInG 
DEtERmInES thE ABIlIty to SUccEED In 
mUltIlAtERAlISm. 
The close compatibility between European 
Integration and multilateralism does not mean 
that the EU will automatically succeed as a 
multilateral player; indeed, the complex internal 
negotiations to reach a common position can make 
it much harder to play a decisive role in global 
multilateralism. Of the many reasons that explain 
the difficulties the EU has in global multilateral 
settings, the one which stands out is its lack of 
internal cohesion. The stark contrast between 
the EU’s ability to play a role in trade negotiations 
in the WTO compared to the fiasco at the 2009 
Copenhagen UN Climate Change Conference, 
for example, illustrates the point. If it wants to 
become a successful multilateral player, the EU 
must expend more effort using the combined 
capabilities of the EU institutions and of EU 
national diplomacies to convince third parties, and 
less time negotiating amongst EU member states.
4. SInGlE voIcE, SInGlE chAIR. 
The EU is more successful in global multilateralism 
when it has a unified voice; the best way of 
ensuring this simple voice is often, but not 
always, to occupy a single, EU chair. This could 
be particularly important in the UN Security 
Council, as well as the IMF, the World Bank, the 
Contact Group for the Balkans, the G20, the P5+1 
negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme, the 
Minsk Group and numerous other multilateral fora. 
This issue is extremely sensitive for member states, 
as illustrated by the efforts of some EU member 
states to sit at the G20 table when it was activated. 
However, it is no longer acceptable to consider 
membership in international organisations and 
in smaller multilateral fora (such as contact 
groups) a crucial issue of sovereignty when so 
many decisions that affect both citizens’ lives and 
national politics are already highly integrated. 
Monetary policy is, given the current situation, the 
most blatant example. The EU is needed to solve 
many global issues, and a normative argument 
in favour of a single strong voice should be made 
to politicians and citizens to circumvent the 
monopolies that national diplomatic services 
guard at an unacceptable cost in terms of both 
increasing European influence and solving urgent 
global challenges.
5. mUltIlAtERAlISm IS A StRAtEGIc choIcE 
WhIch SERvES EU IntERESt. 
Success in multilateralism must not be judged 
only from a purely normative perspective – 
multilateralism as an objective per se – but 
also for its effectiveness, or lack thereof, in the 
production of public goods and the advancement 
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of EU goals. But EU interests must not be too 
narrowly defined. Contradiction between values 
and material interest is a common concern for 
EU policy makers and analysts. When the value at 
stake is the promotion of multilateralism, however, 
this contradiction is often more apparent than 
real. When seen in wider perspective, both of time 
and of issues, promoting multilateral frameworks 
at the expense of some immediate material 
interests is rational. Norm based contexts which 
produce multilateral policies constitute a better 
environment for the EU than crude power politics, 
which test its cohesion and almost invariably put 
the EU at a disadvantage. This is one lesson that 
EU member states have learned from their own 
engagement in European integration and that 
the EU as a whole must not forget: strengthening 
the system is sometimes worth the loss of an 
immediate negotiating goal.
6. cohEREncE In vAlUES DoES not conFER A 
hIGhER moRAl GRoUnD. 
Being flexible in the forms and modalities of 
multilateralism to circumvent the rigidities of 
an exceedingly institutional approach opens the 
possibility that the EU be accused of applying 
double standards. Coherence is a crucial value for 
success in the mid to long term, and the best way 
to ensure it is to apply uniformly the principles 
and values of the EU. But neither this normative 
approach, nor the success of European integration 
itself, confer a higher moral ground to the EU in 
its relations with individual countries or with 
less cohesive and integrated groups of states. 
Despite all its efforts to promote regionalism 
across the planet, the EU has alienated other 
regional groups by stressing its unique level of 
integration and demanding special treatment. 
Nowhere is this more obvious than at the UN, 
when the EU lost a first vote to upgrade its status 
and could only win it after backtracking. Smaller 
sub regional agreements on the peripheries of 
the EU, for example in the Black Sea, have shown 
that EU policies can make it considerably harder 
to maintain, let alone strengthen, looser forms of 
integration as the EU privileges its own strategies 
(enlargement, neighbourhood) over genuine 
multilateral cooperation.
7. thE UnIon mUSt mAkE SPAcE FoR othER 
oRGAnISAtIonS In EURoPE. 
Multilateralism is also changing in Europe. The 
EU is the most advanced and most successful 
expression of multilateralism, but it is not the 
only game in town, and it should not behave that 
way. Despite the enlargement and neighbourhood 
rhetoric, the EU external border has be come the 
strongest dividing element on the Continent. The 
EU needs to rethink its policies in order to open 
some space to wider (OSCE, NATO, Council of 
Europe) and narrower forms of multilateralism. 
This rethink is needed not just to uphold the EU’s 
own commitment to multilateral solutions, but 
also to avoid a new polarisation on the Continent 
(the so called ‘spectre of a multipolar Europe’) 
and the alienation of key players in its immediate 
neighbourhood. Even fragile and imperfect forms 
of regionalism, such as the ones found around the 
Baltic and the Black Sea, can act as steps towards 
an EU- style permanent peace. The usefulness of 
such weaker forms should not be judged, as the 
European Commission tends to do, by whether 
their norms and practices are formally compatible 
with the EU’s own, but rather by whether they 
are helping to produce the changes in behaviour, 
atttitudes and sense of identity that will provide 
the foundation for non violent problem solv ing and 
ultimately, a deeper reaching integration. Some of 
the organisations that are not purely regional but 
play a role have been overlooked by the EU because 
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they do not conform to categories of EU foreign 
relations: for example, GUAM has been overlooked 
in the post Soviet space, and the EU has stressed 
the cooperation that would be ‘desirable’ (for 
example, in the Southern Caucasus) rather than 
supporting the one emanating from the countries 
of the region.
8. thE EU hAS PoWER, BUt ItS FRAGmEntAtIon 
mUSt BE ovERcomE. 
The normative drive to promote multilateralism 
can only be meaningfully satisfied when the EU 
develops the required capabilities. ‘Market Power 
Europe’ has been used to describe a powerful set of 
capabilities in economic issues, in particular those 
related to trade. But in other areas, this power is 
mostly fragmented and diffuse. The EEAS should 
provide a new arm to the EU’s activity in regional 
and global multilateral forums; nonetheless, 
its impact will remain limited for as long as the 
member states’ diplomatic services continue to 
keep substantial parts of their own multilateral 
engagement disconnected from the EEAS and from 
other EU institutions. From intelligence to public 
diplomacy to military force, the EU’s multilateral 
involvement is limited by not having its own 
capabilities. In the case of peace missions, member 
states not only have to contribute the capabilities, 
but even to fund their own participation. Further 
development of CSDP, including a common 
mechanism for financing missions and further 
joint military and civil capabilities will be crucial 
to increase the preparedness and effectiveness of 
EU action. The good news is that the indispensable 
(and most expensive) capabilities exist already 
at the hands of the member states, and they just 
need to be made operational in a joint manner, as 
ESDP/CSDP missions have shown in places like the 
Balkans, Africa and the Indian Ocean.
9. thE EU mUSt look oUtWARD AnD BE 
PREPARED to lIStEn AnD to lEAD. 
There is growing demand for multilateral policies 
in the global and regional arenas for an increasing 
number of issues, from the fight against climate 
change to disease control. The USA has shown 
awareness that unilateralism is seldom the way to 
go, and the emerging powers still prefer systems 
that will constrain the West. There is, therefore, 
demand for more multilateralism and, arguably, 
demand for a larger European role. One thing 
the Euro crisis proves, for instance, is that the 
whole world wants a strong Euro and a strong EU 
in international monetary affairs. This stronger 
European role can only be played in a substantial 
way that is consistent across a broad spectrum 
of issues if the EU acts as a cohesive actor. In this 
most challenging hour of European integration, 
when the main achievements of the EU are 
under unprecedented tension, the Union can 
not afford to look exclusively inwards. Nor can it 
delegate its role in shaping global multilateralism 
to unpredictable combinations of the larger EU 
member states.
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capacity and acceptance. Willingness relates to the 
power that member states entrust upon the EU. 
Whatever the ambitions of the EU are, the need to 
be in tune with the positions of its member states 
is crucial. Capacity refers to the organisational 
capacity and operational experiences. This implies 
not only resources but also sophistication of 
command structures. Acceptance relates to the 
place of the EU in the geopolitical reality and 
the multilateral playing field. This includes the 
institutional collaboration with the UN but also 
its relations with the different powers of today’s 
multipolar world.
The EU has proved to be a formidable aspirant to 
effective multilateralism. In several aspects, it has 
adopted legal regimes and installed mechanisms 
towards ensuring that it continues to play a critical 
role in global and regional peace and security and 
continue to guarantee the trust placed in it by 
its member states. Nonetheless, the EU has not 
always got it right. And much remains to be done. 
In order to continue to be relevant and effective, 
the EU must be more ambitious and daring in its 
approach; it must step out of its comfort zone 
and embrace new prospects. In doing so, the EU 
needs to be purposeful and expedient. In short, 
it will serve the EU a great deal of purpose if it 
stays focused, remains flexible, and acts and reacts 
fast whenever situations arise. This approach is 
As would have been noted from the foregoing 
sections of this report, there is no doubt that 
the EU earnestly desires to play a critical and 
important role in global and regional peace and 
security in an environment of multilateralism. It 
is beyond controversy today that multilateralism 
is the way forward in dealing with some of the 
most daunting challenges and threats to human 
security. The benefit of effective multilateralism 
to states is as assuring as the dividends of 
democratic and security governance are to a world 
of multipolarity.
Certainly, effective multilateralism will necessarily 
require the diminishing and downscaling of the 
much-cherished principle of state sovereignty: 
each state that desires to be a partner in an 
effective multilateral system unavoidably accepts 
the relaxing of its grip on some of the traditional 
frontiers of sovereignty. Collapsing individual 
states’ will and predilictions under a regional 
or international organisation in the name of 
multilateralism implies a high level of trust that 
such an organisation shall deliver what the states 
ask of it through its constitutive instrument or 
state practice.
Together, there are three determinants that 
shape the role and influence of the EU as a global-
regional actor in peace and security: willingness, 
Conclusion: the EU as a 
focused, flexible and fast 
actor in peace and security
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what the EU-GRASP project refers to as the ‘triple 
F’ approach: Flexible, Focused and Fast, which 
concepts are articulated below in seriatim. 
FlExIBlE
One major criticism that has been levelled against 
the EU is that it often fails to take into account the 
individual dynamics and particular contexts of the 
partners it engages with. Instead, the tendency 
is for the EU to adopt a one-size-fits-all strategy, 
which is more often counterproductive. ‘Rigidity’ 
would frequently be injurious to dynamism in a 
multilateral environment, just as unbridled fluidity 
could equally threaten cohesion and undermine 
solidity. What the EU requires, is to temper its 
often-stifling obstinacy with some flexibility. This 
will not only enable the organisation to constantly 
evolve and adapt its strategies in consonance with 
developments around the world, such a process 
will also inspire confidence and increase trust 
among its partners. 
As a regional organisation, the EU has had a 
tendency to emphasise inter-regional dialogue. 
This has brought forth some achievements and 
should be continued. However, the EU should 
endow itself with strategic approaches that 
would allow it to enter into interactions with a 
much wider variety of actors that make up the 
international environment. The focus should be 
on groups of states with multilateral ambitions, as 
well as on international organisations, especially 
the UN system. 
FocUSED
As would have been noted from the case studies 
covered in this project, the EU clearly aspires to 
be an ubiquitous player in the field of peace and 
security. This is commendable. However, the EU 
does not have unlimited human and financial 
resources. Therefore, rather than risk becoming 
something of a jack of many trades and master 
of none, the EU should be more selective in its 
choices. While one may not prescribe for the EU 
exactly the thematic areas it should focus on -as 
an organisation the EU certainly knows where 
its strengths lies – we are of the opinion that the 
EU should be guided by various considerations 
in coming to decisions as to what and what not 
to include in its docket. However, ‘focusing’, as 
proposed by EU-GRASP, should not be mistaken for 
tepidity, or that the EU should stay condemned to 
those issues where it is always guaranteed some 
level of success even with minimal efforts. 
FASt
Finally, the enlargement of the EU to its present 
strength of 27 members definitely bodes well for 
the organisation at least, as far as ventilating the 
ideas of the EU across Europe is concerned. As the 
aphorism goes, the more the merrier, and certainly 
even more so for Europe. However, the more is 
not necessarily the merrier for the EU-decision 
making process. Multilateral institutions are 
often propelled by national rather than collective 
interests of member states. The complex nature 
of CFSP decision-making process in the EU system 
does not help the matter. Debates are often 
endless resulting in either actions not being taken 
in time, taken at all, or taken outside the CSFP 
framework. It is tempting to suggest that core 
decision-making in the EU should be left to a group 
of states. While such a surrogate process will 
certainly reveal the lack of internal cohesion within 
the EU, it may in the short-term help to prevent 
stalemates and impasses. Were this option to 
be adopted, it will enhance EU’s decision-making 
processes and will mean that decisions are reached 
much faster. 
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It will be naïve to assume that ‘fast’ is an easy, 
ready-made option. To start with, the process 
for determining which group of states can 
competently take decisions on behalf of the 
whole EU should be expected to be as vitrolically 
controversial as possible. Nonetheless, it is 
possible that with increased promotion of common 
values by EU institutions, increased information 
exchanges, dialogue and coordination among 
member states, the EU decision-making process 
becomes more expedient. Thus, for now, what 
the EU should focus on is developing mechanisms 
that can help it achieve a faster turn- around 
time in decision-making. A good start might be 
for the organisation to rid itself of the notorious, 
procedural complexities that characterise its 
systems. The institutional transformations 
resulting from the Lisbon Treaty, if made fully 
effective, have the potential to enable the Union to 
act in more timely and coherent way.
36 37
Aggarwal, V. K. & Fogarty, Edward A. (2004) Between Regionalism and Globalism: European Union International Trade 
Strategies, in Aggarval, V.K. and Fogarty, Edward A. (eds), EU Trade Strategies: between Regionalism and Globalism. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-40.
Balfour, R. (2006) Principles of democracy and human rights. A review of the European Union’s strategies towards its 
neighbours, in Lucarelli, S. & Manners, I. (eds) Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, London: Routledge.
Benford, J. (2006) Special Report 1: EU Energy Policy: internal developments and external challenges. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit. 15 May 2006, pp. 39-46.
Biscop, S. & Drieskens, E. (2006) Effective Multilateralism and Collective Security: Empowering the UN. in Smith, K. & 
Laatikainen, K. (eds) Intersecting Multilateralisms: The European Union and the United Nations. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 115-132
Britz, M. & Ojanen, H. (2009) Multilateral Security Governance: Comparing the UN and the EU. In Hallenberg, J. Sperling; 
J. & Wagnsson, C. (eds) European Security Governance. The European Union in a Westphalian World. Abigdon: Routledge, 
pp. 19-39
Bull, H. (1977) The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics. Columbia University Press.
CEC (2004) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the future development 
of the EU Energy Initiative and the modalities for the establishment of an Energy Facility for ACP countries. COM (2004) 711 
final. 
Der Derian, J. (1995) The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard. In Lipschutz, R.D. On Security. New 
York: Columbia University Press, pp. 24-45.
Djelic, M.L. & Quach, S. (2003) Globalisations and Institutions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Farrell, M. (2010) A Move Toward Hybrid Interregionalism in Asia’ in Söderbaum, F. & Stålgren, P. (eds) The European 
Union and the Global South. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 115-140.
Floyd, R. (2007) Human Security and the Copenhagen School’s Securitization Approach: Conceptualizing Human 
Security as a Securitizing Move. Human Security Journal, 5, pp. 38-49.
Hallenberg, J., Sperling, J. & Wagnsson, C. eds., (2009) European Security Governance. The European Union in a 
Westphalian World. Abigdon/New York: Routledge.
Hänggi, H. (2000) Interregionalism: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives. Workshop: Dollars, Democracy and 
Trade: External Influence on Economic Integration in the Americas; Los Angeles, CA, May 18; The Pacific Council on 
International Policy, Los Angeles; The Center for Applied Policy Research, Munich.
Harré, R. (1976) Images of the World and Societal Icons. in Knorr, K.D.,  Strasser, H. & Zilian, H.G. (eds) Determinants and 
Bibliography
38 39
Controls of Scientific Development, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Higgott, R. (2006) International Organisation in Rhodes, R. Binder, S. & Rockman, B. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ip, E. (2010) The Power of International Legal Personality in Regional Integration, UNU-CRIS Working Paper W-2010/4.
Katzenstein, P.J. (2005) A World of Regions. Asia, Europe and the American Imperium. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Keohane, R.O. (1990) Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research, International Journal, 45 (XLV), pp. 731-764.
Keohane, R. O. (1988) International Institutions: Two Approaches, International Studies Quarterly, 32, pp. 379–396.
Keukeleire, S. & MacNaughtan, J. (2008) The Foreign Policy of the European Union. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kirchner, E.J. (2007a) European Union. The European Security Strategy Versus National Preferences. in Kirchner, V & 
Sperling, J. (eds) Global security Governance. Competing perceptions of security in the 21st century. Abigdon/New York: 
Routledge, pp. 113-134.
Kirchner, E.J. (2007b) EU Security Governance in a Wider Europe. in Foradori, P. Rosa, P. & Scartezzini, R. (eds) Managing a 
Multilevel Foreign Policy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 23-43.
Kirchner E.J. & Sperling, J. (2007a) EU Security Governance. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Kirchner, E.J. & Sperling, J. (2007b) Global Security Governance. Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century. 
Abigdon/New York: Routledge. 
Klabbers, J. (2005) Two Concepts of International Organisations, International Organisations Law Review, (2), pp. 277-
293.
Krahmann, E. (2001) The Emergence of security Governance in Post-Cold War Europe. ESRC “One Europe or Severak?” 
Programme Working Paper, 36/01.
Lord, C. (2004) A Democracy Audit of the European Union. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
MacMillan, J. (1998) On Liberal Peace: democracy, war and international order. London: Tauris Academic Studies.
Neal, A.W. (2009) Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX. Journal of Common Market Studies, 
47 (2), pp. 333-56.
Newman, T. & Thakur, R. (2006) Multilateralism under Challenge? Power, International Order and Structural Change. Tokyo: 
United Nations University Press.
Olsen, G. R. (2000) Promotion of democracy as a foreign policy instrument of ‘‘Europe’’: limits to international idealism’, 
Democratization, 7 (2), pp. 142–67.
Ross, C. (2010) Independent Diplomacy, Harvard Business Review, 88(1), p. 57.
Rubinstein, R. A. (2005) Intervention and Culture: an anthropological approach to peace operations, Security Dialogue 
36(4): 527-544.
Ruggie, J.G. (1993) Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form. New York: Columbia University 
Press.
Schiavone, G. (2001) International Organisations: A Dictionary and Directory. New York: Palgrave.
Schlesinger, S.C. (2003) Art of Creation. The Founding of the United Nations. Boulder: Westview Press.
38 39
Schroeder, U.C. (2006) Coping with Complexity. An Organizational Perspective on European Security Governance. EUI 
Working Papers, 2006/09.
Schweller, R.L. (2010) Entropy and the Trajectory of World Politics: Why Polarity has become less Meaningful, Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, 23(1), pp145-163.
Slaughter, A.M. (2004) A New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Smith, K. E. (2001) The EU, human rights and relations with third countries: ‘‘foreign policy’’ with an ethical dimension? 
in Light, M. & Smith, K.E. (eds) Ethics and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Söderbaum, F. & Stålgren, P. (eds) (2010) The European Union and the Global South. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner 
Publishers. 
Sperling, J. (2003) Eurasian security governance: new threats, institutional adaptations. In: Sperling, J., Kay, S. & 
Papacosma, V.S. (eds) Limiting Institutions? The Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance. Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2003, pp. 3-28.
Sperling, J. (2009) Introduction. Security Governance in a Westphalian World. in Hallenberg, J. Sperling, J. & Wagnsson, C. 
(eds) European Security Governance. The European Union in a Westphalian World. Abigdon/New York: Routledge, pp. 1-16.
Spurk, C. (2008) Forget Impact: Concentrate on Measuring Outcomes’ New Routes Journal: Reflections on Peacebuilding 
Evaluation, Vol. 13.
Stone, D. (2004) Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the “Transnationalisation” of Policy, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 11, pp. 545-566.
Stone, D. (2008) Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy Communities and their Networks, Journal of Policy Sciences, 
36(10), pp. 19-38.
Svensson, I. & Brattberg, E. (2008) A New Approach to Measure Impact of Peacebuilding Interventions, New Routes 
Journal: Reflections on Peacebuilding Evaluation, Vol. 13.
Thakur, R. & Van Langenhove, L. (2006) ‘Enhancing Global Governance through Regional Integration’, Global Governance, 
12(3), pp. 233-240.
Van Langenhove L. (2007) Globalisation and the Rise of a neo-Westphalian World order of States and Regions, in 
Steinmetzová, D. Conference Proceedings: Globalisation Challenges and New Trends of Governance, pp.19-34. 
Van Langenhove L. (2008) Power to the Regions, but not yet Farewell to the Nation State, Europe’s World, pp. 113-115.
Webber, M., Croft, S., Howorth, J., Terriff, T. & Krahmann, E. (2004) The Governance of European Security, Review of 
International Studies, 30, 3, pp. 3-26.
Weiss, T.G. (2008) What’s Wrong with the United Nations and how to Fix it. London: Polity Press.
Woodrow, P. & Chigas, D. (2008) Demystifying Impacts in Evaluation Practice, New Routes Journal: Reflections on 
Peacebuilding Evaluation, Vol. 13.
Youngs, R. (2001) European Union democracy promotion policies: ten years on, European Foreign Affairs Review, 6 (3), pp. 
355–73.
40
